
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS

VETO COMPENDIUM

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ABOUT THE COMPENDIUM

THIS DOCUMENT IS MEANT AS A COMPANION TO THE *ILLEGITIMATE CONCERNS* REPORT. Within these pages, you will find details about the vetoes analyzed in the report, along with commentary regarding the coding. In the process of compiling the information, a second analysis of the source material was made. This ensures a higher degree of reliability, as every veto was checked against the coding procedure a second time.

As a result, some of the vetoes have been recoded to better correspond to the definitions of legitimate or illegitimate vetoes laid out in the report. All of these have been recoded from *unclear* in the first revisions of the report to *illegitimate* in revisions from February 2015 and forwards. This is due to a less strict coding in the initial research phase.

For more information on what is considered an illegitimate veto, see the main report.

HOW TO READ THE COMPENDIUM

EACH VETO WAS EXAMINED FROM THREE PERSPECTIVES. These perspectives were operationalized into three questions. These questions were:

1. In short, what are the contents of the vetoed draft resolution?
2. Who cast the veto and what was the motivation given?
3. Why do we consider it legitimate or illegitimate?

In the following pages each of the answers 1-3 will correspond to their respective question. Make sure to have this page at hand if you want to review the questions while reading.

Each veto is headed by a line of background information. This is meant to ease the review of the source material used in the study. The key below details the meaning of the data in each cell of that line.

| ID | Year | Draft resolution | Record | Veto cast by | Initial coding | Review coding |
|-----------|-------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | 1993 | S/25693 | S/PV.3211 | Russia | No | No |

ID The ID number is our internal number used to identify each veto¹. The earliest vetoes receive low numbers, while more recent have ID numbers in the 30's.

Year The year the vote on the draft resolution took place.

Draft resolution The identifier for the official draft resolution. The link will take you to the official PDF file of the vetoed draft resolution.

Record The identifier for the official meeting records. The link will take you to a PDF of the meeting records, in which the speeches given in connection to the vote is transcribed.

Veto cast by The permanent member casting this particular veto. While a draft resolution can be vetoed by more than one permanent member, each veto is analyzed separately.

Initial coding The coding from the first review of the source material. This was the basis for the analysis in the two first revisions of the report, but is now obsolete.

Review coding The current, more accurate, coding. This is the basis for any revisions of the report published from February 2015 and onwards.

¹ Note that the vetoes are looked at individually. If two members veto the same draft, each of the two vetoes will receive a number. Russia and China, having both vetoed draft resolution S/2014/348, has therefore been considered separately and received ID numbers 32 and 33, respectively.

THE VETOES

| | | | | | | |
|---|------|-------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 1 | 1993 | S/25693 | S/PV.3211 | Russia | No | No |
|---|------|-------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. In the draft resolution, the United Kingdom called for a reform of the UNFICYP (the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus) and a redefinition of the costs so as to make them expenses under Article 17 (2) of the UN Charter. The funding would then have come from the UN budget, rather than from voluntary contributions.
2. Russia vetoed this draft resolution, with the motivation that the expenses should not be made part of the UN budget. The reasoning was that making funding such as this anything but voluntary would jeopardize the existence of this kind of mission.
3. This is an illegitimate veto, according to our standards, since it is not motivated by a threat to the sovereignty or security for Russia. A question of the funding of peacekeeping missions do not endanger Russia.

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|---|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 2 | 1994 | S/1994/1358 | S/PV.3475 | Russia | No | No |
|---|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. This draft resolution concerned the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the areas in Croatia under UN protection. It was presented with the intention of implementing sanctions authorized in Security Council Resolution 820 (1993), and as a response to the blockade of humanitarian aid set up by some of the belligerent groups.
2. Russia motivated its veto by claiming that the sanctions would be counterproductive and would have negative consequences for Yugoslavia – who, according to Russia, had shown an increasing willingness to cooperate with the international community.
3. The motivations provided by Russia do not live up to the criteria for a legitimate veto. Russia's security or sovereignty were not threatened, and the veto was therefore illegitimate.

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|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 3 | 1995 | S/1995/394 | S/PV.3538 | USA | No | No |
|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. The draft resolution called upon Israel to refrain from all settlement activities and other actions on occupied territories that the authors of the draft considered as threatening to the peace process between Israel and Palestine.
2. The United States, in connection with their veto of this draft resolution, voiced concern that the proposed text would endanger the peace process.
3. The veto was not cast to protect US security or sovereignty, and is therefore illegitimate.

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|---|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|
| 4 | 1997 | S/1997/18 | S/PV.3730 | China | No | No |
|---|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|

1. The resolution concerned the recent de-escalation in the conflict between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. In essence, the resolution proposed a decision to authorize a peacekeeping operation to Guatemala, a call upon both parties to commit to the peace agreement, and an invitation for continued support to the peace process from the international community.
2. The basis for this veto was that China had experienced Guatemalan actions as meant “to infringe upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” in the previous four years. One such action was inviting Taiwan to the signing of the peace agreement. Therefore, China was not willing to show any support for Guatemala in the Security Council.
3. This veto is clearly illegitimate, because the draft resolution in itself did not pose a threat to China’s sovereignty. Even if the question of sovereignty is brought up as a motivation, no legitimate reason was given to why this draft resolution had to be stopped to ensure core Chinese interests.

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|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 5 | 1997 | S/1997/199 | S/PV.3747 | USA | No | No |
|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. This draft resolution sought to dissuade Israel from “changing facts on the ground” through renewed settlement activities, and to call upon the Israeli government to follow its international obligations.

2. The United States vetoed this draft resolution, saying that it interfered with the peace negotiations and made too sweeping statements on the legal status of the settlements. It also claimed that the draft resolution laid blame on only one side of the conflict, making it unbalanced.
3. The veto did not protect the sovereignty or security of the United States, and as such cannot be considered legitimate according to our definition.

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|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 6 | 1997 | S/1997/241 | S/PV.3756 | USA | No | No |
|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. The draft resolution concerns the situation in the Middle East, and more specifically the Israeli occupation of parts of the Palestinian Territories. It outlines a need for support for the implementation of the agreements already made between Israel and Palestine.
2. The United States cast the veto, claiming that the resolution, if passed, would be an intrusion into the ongoing negotiations and therefore would lead to more difficult talks.
3. This is an illegitimate veto, since the US does not base its opposition on any perceived threat against their sovereignty or security.

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|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|
| 7 | 1999 | S/1999/201 | S/PV.3982 | China | No | No |
|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|

1. The purpose of this draft resolution was to extend the UNPREDEP mission in FYR Macedonia for an additional six months. The draft was presented by a number of countries, primarily Western.
2. The draft was vetoed by China. The Chinese representative argued that the goals of the mission had been met, and that the resources allocated to it would be better spent elsewhere.
3. Nothing in the draft resolution threatens the security or sovereignty of China. Instead it deals exclusively with the extension of a peacekeeping mission, making this veto illegitimate.

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|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 8 | 2001 | S/2001/270 | S/PV.4305 | USA | No | No |
|---|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. As a reaction to the situation in the Middle East, the escalating conflict between Israel and Palestine and failing peace talks, this draft resolution was meant to force both parties back to the negotiations. It also required that Israeli settlements and blockades of supplies to the Occupied Palestinian Territories ceased.
2. The US claimed that this was a premature resolution, and motivated its veto by arguing that the parties to a conflict must themselves find and implement solutions rather than be forced to it. That would create the, in the long-term, most viable peace. They also argued that the draft resolution was too biased in favor of Palestine– thus making it unfair as well as dysfunctional.
3. The security interests and the sovereignty of the United States was not under threat from this draft resolution, nor did the US delegation aim to present it that way. The veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|---|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 9 | 2001 | S/2001/1199 | S/PV.4438 | USA | No | No |
|---|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. Draft resolution S/2001/1199 was an attempt to get negotiations back on track in the conflict between Israel and Palestine and to undo some of the damage caused by increased violence since September the year before. It condemned terrorism as well as extra-judiciary executions, excessive use of force and “wide destruction of properties”, while calling for the implementation of the Mitchell Committee recommendation.
2. The United States used its veto, claiming that the draft resolution did not contribute to the peace process and that it sided with only one of the parties to the conflict. Furthermore, the draft resolution did not, according to the US, sufficiently address the issue of Palestinian terrorism against Israel.
3. The draft resolution did not pose a threat to the security or sovereignty of the United States. As such, this veto is illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|---------|---------|
| 10 | 2002 | S/2002/712 | S/PV.4563 | USA | Unclear | Unclear |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|---------|---------|

1. Draft resolution S/2002/712 concerned an extension of the planned assistance to the peace building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through – among other means – continued support to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
2. The United States vetoed the draft resolution claiming it was to ensure their national jurisdiction over their personnel and officials involved in United Nations peacekeeping and in coalition-of-the-willing operations. The US does not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC, and concerns about risks to their peacekeepers resulted in them vetoing the draft resolution.
3. The United States presents a case based in the question of whether the ICC has jurisdiction over its personnel. As such, the concerns suggest that the veto is legitimate, as the jurisdiction of a court not recognized by a state is a challenge to the sovereignty of that state. It is unclear, however, if this resolution, if passed, would have presented any such challenges to US sovereignty in itself.

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|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 11 | 2002 | S/2002/1385 | S/PV.4681 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. The draft resolution condemned the killing of UN employees and the destruction of World Food Program resources intended to aid Palestinian refugees, and demanded Israel to comply with its international obligations to protect civilians and refrain from disproportionate use of violence.
2. The United States motivated its veto by stating that they saw the draft resolution more as a condemnation of the Israeli occupation than as a way to ensure the safety of UN personnel.
3. In this case, the veto is not used to protect the veto state's security or sovereignty, but to protect an allied state. As such, the veto is illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 12 | 2003 | S/2003/891 | S/PV.4828 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. This draft resolution was meant to highlight the violent development in the Palestinian Territories. It called for the protection of civilians and for Israel to respect, and to refrain from threats against, the democratically elected Palestinian administration.
2. The US vetoed this draft, claiming it was an unfair representation of the situation in the Middle East since it did not consider violent acts committed by terrorist groups located in the Palestinian Territories.
3. There is no argument in opposition of the draft from the United States delegation that brings up any threats against US security or sovereignty. The veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 13 | 2003 | S/2003/980 | S/PV.4842 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. This draft resolution was put forward by Guinea, Malaysia, Pakistan and Syria with the aim of declaring the Israeli construction of a wall in the Palestinian Territories illegal. It also included a clause meant to force Israel to cancel the construction, and to demolish those parts of the wall already in place.
2. This veto was cast by the United States. The reason given was that the draft did not condemn terrorism, was imbalanced and did not accurately take into consideration the larger security context of the Middle East. A resolution only focusing on the wall would not, according to the US, contribute to peace and security in the region.
3. As this draft did not pose any danger to the security or sovereignty of the United States, the veto should be considered illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 14 | 2004 | S/2004/240 | S/PV.4934 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. Escalating violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, along with the death of the founders and spiritual leaders of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in Israeli bombings was the background to this draft resolution. It called for a cease-fire, a return to two-state plan in the peace negotiations, and condemned the killing of Yassin.
2. According to the United States, the situation in Israel and the similar violence committed by Hamas was not covered in the draft resolution. As such, the draft resolution was, in their view, one-sided and inaccurate. This led to the US veto of the draft.
3. The US motivation for the veto reflects a perceived lack of balance in the treatment of the parties to the conflict. It does not, however, concern the security or sovereignty of the US, and the veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 15 | 2004 | S/2004/313 | S/PV.4947 | Russia | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. This draft resolution would, if passed, have replaced the UNFICYP with a new monitoring mission, UNSIMIC, and provided instructions for such a mission. It would also have put in place an arms embargo on Cyprus and a related monitoring committee under the Security Council.
2. The Russian delegation wanted to await a referendum scheduled to take part in both the Greek and Turkish sides of Cyprus, and claimed that the draft resolution was “precipitous”. Russia therefore vetoed the draft resolution.
3. Russia admitted that the veto was a “technical” one, rather than protecting any of the core interests defined in our study as legitimate grounds for a veto. The veto is therefore classified as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 16 | 2004 | S/2004/783 | S/PV.5051 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. Draft resolution S/2004/783 concerned the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. It condemned the broad military incursions and attacks by the Israeli occupying forces in the area of Northern Gaza Strip. It also condemned all acts of violence, terror, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, and physical destruction. It called on both parties to immediately implement their obligations under the Road Map and with this goal in mind closely cooperate with the “Quartet” of international intermediaries.
2. The United States saw the draft resolution as being lopsided and unbalanced, as putting too much emphasis on wrong-doings of Israel and that it did not acknowledge Israel’s need to protect itself. The US furthermore claimed it would embolden terrorists. Due to the draft resolution’s alleged imbalance and omissions of material, the US viewed it as lacking of credibility and that it deserved a nay vote.
3. As the motivation to the veto concerned Israel’s security, and not that of the United States, the veto is classified as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 17 | 2006 | S/2006/508 | S/PV.5488 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. The draft resolution condemned all acts of violence and terrorism in Israel and Palestine, and called on both sides to release detained soldiers and civilians from the other party, to refrain from the use of terrorism and excessive violence, and stressed the importance of resuming negotiations. The draft resolution also called for humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.
2. In addition to considering the draft resolution outdated given new developments on the ground, the United States found the text unbalanced, placing disproportionate demands on Israel. The US also claimed it ignored that Israeli action was a response to acts of terrorism from the Palestinian side.
3. We consider the veto illegitimate because it was not used to protect US security or sovereignty, but to protect its ally.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|-------------|----|
| 18 | 2006 | S/2006/878 | S/PV.5565 | USA | Unclear/yes | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|-------------|----|

1. The draft resolution called for an immediate ceasefire in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in response to the increase in violence in the region. Breaches of international law and violence against the civilian population were denounced specifically.
2. The United States vetoed this draft resolution, claiming it was biased against Israel and that it was politically rather than judicially motivated. The call for an international mechanism to protect civilians was deemed improbable and therefore not relevant to include in a Security Council resolution. Finally, the US delegation argued that terrorism from Palestinian organizations should not be excluded from the draft, and that such activities are a threat not only to Israel but also to the United States.
3. The United States does motivate their veto with their own security in mind. However, the resolution itself is not a threat to them since its acceptance by the Security Council would not constitute Palestinian terrorism and vetoing it would not stop such activities. Note also that the exclusion of such clauses in a draft resolution does not encourage or support terrorism. The veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 19 | 2007 | S/2007/14 | S/PV.5619 | Russia | No | No |
|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. The draft resolution concerned the government use of excessive violence against the civilian protests in Myanmar known as the Saffron Revolution. It was meant to force the Myanmar government to immediately cease the military attacks on civilians and the breaches of human rights provisions – including ending sexual violence committed by the military. It also called for political action that would promote democratization, and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi along with all other political prisoners.
2. Russia cast the veto with the motivation that the situation in Myanmar did not constitute a threat to international security, and that adopting a resolution about such a topic would upset the division of labor in the UN.
3. This is an illegitimate veto. The draft proposal did not threaten the security and sovereignty of Russia.

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|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|
| 20 | 2007 | S/2007/14 | S/PV.5619 | China | No | No |
|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 19 above.)
2. Using the sovereignty principle as main motivation, China vetoed this draft resolution claiming it concerned internal matters of the state of Myanmar. They also argued that the situation did not constitute a threat to international or regional peace and security, and that it therefore was not under the mandate of the Security Council to act on. The Chinese delegation further stated that transition to democracy takes time and cannot be rushed.
3. The Chinese motivation for the veto does not address any perceived threats against its own security interests or sovereignty. As such, the veto cannot be seen as legitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 21 | 2008 | S/2008/447 | S/PV.5933 | Russia | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. A number of states, consisting primarily of western states, put forward this draft resolution with the intention of condemning election-related violence and breaches of human rights obligations in Zimbabwe, as well as introducing action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It furthermore requested of the Secretary-General that a Special Representative with the situation in Zimbabwe as his or her responsibility be appointed, and it would have imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on the state and its leaders.
2. Russia believed that this was an attempt to take Security Council action in an area where there is no mandate for the Council to act, “artificially” classifying this and other situations as threats to international peace and security. The veto was also motivated by a claim that the draft resolution would complicate diplomatic efforts in the conflict.
3. Russia’s core interests were not at stake in the consideration of this draft resolution. Its security and sovereignty would have remained intact even if the resolution would have been passed, and the veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|
| 22 | 2008 | S/2008/447 | S/PV.5933 | China | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 21 above.)
2. China vetoed the draft resolution, claiming it would complicate the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, and that sanctions were rash and against the recommendations of African leaders.
3. The veto did not act as a protection of the security or sovereignty of China, and is thus illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|---------|----|
| 23 | 2009 | S/2009/310 | S/PV.6143 | Russia | Unclear | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|---------|----|

1. The draft resolution called for an extension of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) mandate, allowing the mission to continue ensuring compliance with the ceasefire between Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities until the 30th of June 2009.
2. Given new developments on the ground, Russia stated it did not believe an extension of the mandate to be of any use since it did not reflect the political realities on the ground, and instead wanted to see a new mission adjusted to the new security regimes in the area.
3. The Russian delegation did not refer to its own security or sovereignty in the motivation for the veto. While the conflict took place close to its borders, Russia chose not to invoke the risks to its own state as a motivation. Additionally, the effect of passing the draft resolution would not threaten Russian security. The veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|
| 24 | 2011 | S/2011/24 | S/PV.6484 | USA | No | No |
|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----|----|----|

1. This draft resolution was meant to highlight the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and their status in international law. It called for the international community to demonstrate the importance in that both parties to the conflict are held responsible according to their international obligations.
2. The veto was cast by the United States, with the motivation that the resolution would be counterproductive in the quest for peace. The US delegation instead called for assistance to the parties of the conflict so that a direct solution could be achieved without the intermingling of other states.
3. The United States does not base its resistance to the veto in a concern for its own security or sovereignty. This veto should therefore be considered illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 25 | 2011 | S/2011/612 | S/PV.6627 | Russia | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. This draft resolution demanded that government violence against civilians in the escalating Syrian conflict cease, and that international and human rights law be respected. The resolution also opened up for a use of the UN Charter Article 41 on the forceful measures, including military force, available to the Security Council.
2. Russia vetoed this resolution, claiming it did not respect Syrian sovereignty and that it did not condemn extremism within all the parties to the conflict. Also, the international community, Russia argued, could take part in the resolution of the conflict by starting a peace process gradually leading to liberalization – but that force would be the wrong way to go.
3. Even if this veto is motivated by sovereignty, the draft does not pose any threat to Russia itself. The veto must therefore be considered illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|------------|----|
| 26 | 2011 | S/2011/612 | S/PV.6627 | China | Unclear/no | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|------------|----|

1. (See Veto ID 25 above.)
2. While presenting an alternative draft resolution together with Russia, China argued against this draft resolution on the basis that it would constitute a breach of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. This draft was therefore vetoed.
3. While the question of sovereignty was brought up by the Chinese delegation, none of the clauses in the draft resolution would jeopardize Chinese sovereignty or security and the veto is therefore illegitimate. The failure of the Syrian government to protect its people could instead constitute a legitimate ground for action under the principle of Responsibility to Protect, even if the principle of sovereignty remains.

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|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 27 | 2012 | S/2012/77 | S/PV.6711 | Russia | No | No |
|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. This draft resolution was presented at the Security Council in October 2012, in support of the Arab League's aim to stop the conflict in Syria. It demanded that the Syrian government and all other parties put an end to all violence and to support a peaceful transition, including welcoming other actors to monitor the process and access to humanitarian assistance.
2. Russia claimed that the draft resolution would have undermined any possibility of a political settlement, encouraged power aspiration in the opposition and constituted provocation and nurturing of the armed struggle.
3. The veto did not remove a threat to Russian security or sovereignty, since the draft resolution contained nothing that would jeopardize those interests directly.

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|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|
| 28 | 2012 | S/2012/77 | S/PV.6711 | China | No | No |
|----|------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 27 above.)
2. China argued that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria would not be fully respected, and that the draft resolution would not help resolve the Syrian issue. Furthermore, China argued that since the international community was divided over the Syrian issue, the draft resolution would not help to maintain the unity and authority of the Security Council nor help to properly resolve the issue.
3. No threat to China's national sovereignty or security is mentioned in the motivation for the veto. As such, the veto is classified as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|------------|----|
| 29 | 2012 | S/2012/538 | S/PV.6810 | Russia | Unclear/no | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|------------|----|

1. The draft resolution was written in the wake of the ongoing conflict in Syria, particularly addressing violence against civilians and the humanitarian crisis that had occurred previously. It sought more comprehensive action by the UN to ensure a political solution and to guarantee the security of the civilian population in Syria.
2. Russia's veto was a response to the inclusion of Chapter VII action in the text of the draft resolution. It argued that such provisions was a geopolitical move from the western countries and that it would harm the sovereignty of Syria and the peace process.
3. Russia, while arguing that this draft resolution would have posed a threat to sovereignty, it was not its own state that would have been affected by this. The veto is therefore illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|
| 30 | 2012 | S/2012/538 | S/PV.6810 | China | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 29 above.)
2. China cast its veto claiming its acceptance would cause further division between the parties to the conflict and that it is unbalanced. Furthermore, according to the Chinese delegation, it would weaken the confidence in international peace talks as the resolution would be considered an intrusion into the national sovereignty of Syria.
3. We consider this veto illegitimate since China did not motivate it by showing it to be a threat to its own security or sovereignty. Instead, China explicitly states that it has no interests in the region.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|---------|----|
| 31 | 2014 | S/2014/189 | S/PV.7138 | Russia | Unclear | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|---------|----|

1. This draft resolution was presented in connection to a controversial referendum on the status of the Crimea. The western and former Soviet states sponsoring it wanted the Ukraine to live up to its international obligations, and that the referendum would not be recognized by states and organizations.
2. Russia, with the motivation that the people of the Crimea had long been denied self-determination, vetoed the draft resolution. It was also argued that the referendum was indeed legitimate, and that Kyiv obstructed freedom in the Ukraine.
3. It is possible to argue with some success that as Russia is party to the conflict, the draft resolution did threaten the security and sovereignty of Russia. The contents of the draft resolution text, and its possible consequences, however, render this argument fairly weak. Also, the conflict takes place solely on territory outside of Russia. The veto should therefore be considered illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|
| 32 | 2014 | S/2014/348 | S/PV.7180 | Russia | No | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|----|----|

1. Using a mechanism for referral to the International Criminal Court, this draft resolution aimed to have the situation in Syria put before that court. The authors of the draft considered violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, from all parties to the conflict, grave enough to motivate such a referral. It would have further established the Syrian conflict as a threat to international peace and security, allowing the Security Council to act.
2. While questioning the motivations behind this draft resolution and the western approach to the ICC, Russia vetoed this draft resolution. According to its delegation, such a referral would only escalate the conflict, and open up for military intervention.
3. Russian security and sovereignty would not have been at stake with the acceptance of this resolution. The veto must therefore be considered illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|------------|----|
| 33 | 2014 | S/2014/348 | S/PV.7180 | China | Unclear/no | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|------------|----|

1. (See Veto ID 32 above.)
2. China, not itself a party to the ICC, motivated its veto by arguing that any referral to the ICC should be done “on the basis of respect for State judicial sovereignty” – something that China did not consider to be the case here.
3. The question of sovereignty is brought up in defense of the veto, but there is no threat to Chinese sovereignty in this draft resolution. The veto, therefore, is classified as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 34 | 2015 | S/2015/508 | S/PV.7481 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. The draft resolution concerned the Srebrenica massacre and was presented at the time of the 20th anniversary of the events. It called for better prevention of genocide, and condemned what happened in Srebrenica.
2. Russia vetoed to the draft, and in doing so claimed that it was “unhelpful, confrontational and politically motivated”. Furthermore, the Russian delegation said that the draft would make lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina more difficult.
3. The veto is not legitimate, since Russia’s immediate interests are not at stake, and are not brought up in defense of the veto. The draft resolution cannot be said to constitute a threat to Russian sovereignty or security.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 35 | 2015 | S/2015/562 | S/PV.7498 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. A year after the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukrainian airspace, 18 states presented a draft resolution on the topic to the Security Council. Its main purpose was to establish an international tribunal to investigate the events.
2. In a speech given by the Russian Ambassador to the UN at the time of the vote, the veto was motivated by what Russia saw as a “premature, ill-defined and legally untenable” draft resolution. Russia further claimed that tribunals are not efficient when it comes to investigating events such as this and that this draft was politically motivated.
3. The Russian standpoint does not outline any threats to Russia’s security or sovereignty that may emanate from the adoption of the draft resolution. As such the veto should be considered illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 36 | 2016 | S/2016/846 | S/PV.7785 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. The topic of the draft resolution is the situation in Syria. The draft called for the cessation of hostilities and for compliance with international law. It also demanded an end to aerial bombardment and the establishment of a military no-fly zone over Aleppo. Finally, called for all parties to prevent material and financial support from reaching terrorists.
2. The Russian Federation vetoed the draft resolution, questioning the scope of the suggested no-fly zone, the process of introducing the draft and the plan for its implementation.
3. The Russian Federation did not present a case for why the draft resolution would jeopardize the direct security or sovereignty of Russia, and therefore the veto is coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|
| 37 | 2016 | S/2016/1026 | S/PV.7825 | China | N/A | No |
|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|

1. The draft resolution outlines a cease-fire in Syria, including humanitarian access, and demands compliance with international law. It also condemns violence, while demanding cessation of support to, and cooperation with terrorist groups, so as to combat such groups.
2. China's motivation for the veto was that consensus on the draft resolution was not reached, and that action on the draft was premature – and therefore counterproductive.
3. The draft resolution did not constitute a threat to Chinese security or sovereignty, nor was any such motivation given by the Chinese representative on the Council. Because of this, the veto is coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| 38 | 2016 | S/2016/1026 | S/PV.7825 | Russia | N/A | No. |
|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|

1. (See Veto ID 37 above.)
2. The Russian stance on the draft resolution was that it constituted a violation of the Council's Rules of Procedure, while its contents would provide an opportunity for armed groups to rearm and resupply during the cease-fire. Russia also considered the draft resolution as undermining the peace process.
3. None of the given motivations for the veto are linked to the direct security and sovereignty of the Russian Federation, and the veto is therefore coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| 39 | 2017 | S/2017/172 | S/PV.7893 | Russia | N/A | No. |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|

1. The draft resolution aimed to introduce sanctions against actors involved in the Syrian civil war, especially focused on chemical weapons after reports of their continued used in the conflict. The sanctions were meant to be introduced under Chapter VII in the UN Charter.
2. Russia questioned the validity of the report that was the foundation of the call for the sanctions in the draft resolution and claimed that the sanctions were aimed specifically at the Syrian government and not all the actors guilty of using chemical weapons
3. Russia does not provide any motivation that would link the draft resolution to a direct threat to their security and sovereignty of Russia itself. The veto is therefore coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|-----|
| 40 | 2017 | S/2017/172 | S/PV.7893 | China | N/A | No. |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|-----|

1. (See Veto ID 39 above.)
2. China raised concerns that the investigation forming the basis of the argument for sanctions was still underway at the time of the vote, and vetoed the draft resolution because of this.
3. This veto is coded as illegitimate, as China presents no argument for why the draft resolution, if passed, would constitute a threat to Chinese security or sovereignty.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| 41 | 2017 | S/2017/315 | S/PV.7922 | Russia | N/A | No. |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|

1. The draft resolution condemns the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and requests an investigation by the UN and the OPCW.
2. The Russian Federation vetoed the draft resolution with the motivation that it does not serve a useful purpose, that it unfairly put the blame on one side of the conflict and that an investigation of the events had to precede a Security Council resolution.
3. This veto is coded as illegitimate, as there is no direct and credible threat to Russia's security or sovereignty in the draft resolution.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| 42 | 2017 | S/2017/884 | S/PV.8073 | Russia | N/A | No. |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|

1. The draft resolution was meant to renew the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), thus extending their investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria.
2. The Russian Federation vetoed the draft resolution with the motivation that the draft resolution was premature seeing that a report from the JIM was due to be released shortly after the vote on the draft resolution, and that a decision on the extension of the mandate should be made after the report had been presented.
3. This veto is coded as illegitimate, as the draft resolution does not constitute a direct threat to Russia's security or sovereignty.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| 43 | 2017 | S/2017/962 | S/PV.8105 | Russia | N/A | No. |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|

1. The draft resolution followed up on the most recent previous vetoed draft resolution (S/2017/884) in that it was meant to renew the mandate for the JIM investigations in Syria. It differs, however, from the previous draft resolution in that it is more detailed and puts more emphasis on the Fact-Finding Mission's (FFM) role in the investigation.
2. The Russian Federation argued that the draft resolution entrenched "systemic flaws" in the work of the JIM, and that the draft resolution is unbalanced. It should also be noted that the Russian Federation also had a competing draft resolution up for a vote in the same meeting.
3. The veto is not motivated as a response to a perceived threat to Russian security or sovereignty, and the veto is therefore coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| 44 | 2017 | S/2017/970 | S/PV.8107 | Russia | N/A | No. |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|-----|

1. The draft resolution was an attempt at a technical 30 day roll-over of the JIM mandate previously the subject of draft resolutions S/2017/884 and S/2017/962 (see above), in order to facilitate further negotiation on the terms of a longer-term mandate renewal.
2. The Russian motivation for this veto referred back to the arguments for the previous Russian veto (see S/2017/962) , saying that "no extension of the JIM's mandate is possible unless we fix the fundamental shortcomings in its work".
3. There is no reference to Russian security or sovereignty in the motivation for the veto, and the veto is therefore coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| 45 | 2017 | S/2017/1060 | S/PV.8139 | USA | N/A | Yes |
|----|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|-----|-----|

1. The draft resolution, presented by Egypt, was meant to make decisions that in effect changes the (diplomatic) status of Jerusalem “null and void”. This was in response to a recent controversial decision by the United States to move their diplomatic mission to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
2. The United States vetoed the draft resolution, stating that it threatened their own sovereignty through voiding the decision of where to place their embassy to Israel.
3. As the United States claims, with well-founded arguments, that this draft resolution was a threat to their sovereignty, the veto is coded as legitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 46 | 2018 | S/2018/156 | S/PV.8190 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. Presented by the United Kingdom, this draft resolution was meant to, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, renew a number of previously established sanctions against Yemeni individuals.
2. The Russian Federation’s veto against the draft resolution was motivated by a lack of consensus regarding the wording of parts of the draft resolution. Primarily, Russian concern seems to center around the mention of Iran’s role in the conflict. After the veto, another similar but not identical draft resolution was presented by Russia and it won unanimous support in the Council, leading to the eventual renewal of the sanctions.
3. There is nothing in the draft resolution or the Russian statement that would suggest that this would constitute a threat to Russian security or sovereignty. The veto is thus coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 47 | 2018 | S/2018/321 | S/PV.8228 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. This draft resolution was presented in an attempt to condemn the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as to set up mechanisms for investigating alleged uses of such weapons.

2. The Russian Federation claimed that the investigation suggested in the draft resolution was not fair and that other states were trying to lay the blame on the Syrian government prematurely.
3. The Russian Federation does not claim that the draft resolution presented a direct threat to their own security or sovereignty, and the veto is therefore coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|-----|----|
| 48 | 2018 | S/2018/516 | S/PV.8274 | USA | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----|-----|----|

1. The draft resolution in question consisted of a number of clauses that, if passed, would have functioned as statements made by the Security Council on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also would have tasked the Secretary General with producing a report on the situation.
2. The United States, in its speech before the vote, stated that the draft resolution was one-sided and that it failed to recognize the negative influence on the conflict from Hamas. The US also presented an alternative draft resolution which failed irrespective of permanent members' votes.
3. The United States make no reference to their own immediate security or sovereignty in their statement, and the draft resolution itself cannot be argued to threaten their security or sovereignty. The veto is therefore coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 49 | 2019 | S/2019/186 | S/PV.8476 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. The draft resolution, introduced by the United States, was a response to the political situation in Venezuela. It's operative clauses consisted of a number of statements in support of democratic processes in Venezuela, but did not call for any action on behalf of the UN or the international community.
2. The Russian Federation vetoed the draft resolution, stating that the draft was an attempt to intervene in the domestic politics of a sovereign state rather than to help its people.
3. The Russian Federation justified its veto through mentions of sovereignty, but as it is not referring to its own sovereignty but that of another state, the veto is coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|
| 50 | 2019 | S/2019/186 | S/PV.8476 | China | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 49 above.)
2. China vetoed the draft resolution, stating that “China opposes external forces interfering in Venezuela’s internal affairs [...]”.
3. Although China refers to state sovereignty in its justification of the veto, the reference is not to China’s own sovereignty, and the veto is thus coded as illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 51 | 2019 | S/2019/756 | S/PV.8623 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. The draft resolution aimed to avoid a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria and called for all parties to immediately cease hostilities. Furthermore, it demanded that all counterterrorism actions be compliant with international law and to apply the principles of distinction and proportionality.
2. The Russian Federation vetoed the draft resolution, stating that it was based on misinformation and the goal of the text was to save international terrorists in Idlib and present Russia and Syria as responsible for creating the situation.
3. The Russian Federation’s motivation is only related to the situation in Syria and the threat of terrorism but does not address concerns regarding their own national security or sovereignty and the veto is therefore coded illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|
| 52 | 2019 | S/2019/756 | S/PV.8623 | China | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 51 above.)
2. China vetoed the draft resolution, stating that the humanitarian situation was caused by terrorists and the draft resolution did not touch upon the essence of the issue and was unbalanced.
3. Although China mentions Syria’s sovereignty, the veto does not concern China’s own sovereignty or security and is therefore coded illegitimate.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|
| 53 | 2019 | S/2019/961 | S/PV.8697 | Russia | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|

1. The draft resolution aimed to extend the mechanism created in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution 2165 (2014). This would have allowed UN humanitarian agencies to continue to use border crossings, with the exception of Al-Ramtha, to deliver humanitarian aid to Syria. In addition to demanding unimpeded access for humanitarian convoys to all requested areas and populations, the draft resolution called for improved monitoring and requested an independent, written, review from the Secretary General regarding the cross-border operations.
2. The Russian Federation vetoed the draft resolution stating that it was obsolete because the situation in Syria had changed. They stated further that the draft resolution contained politically motivated provisions and did not consider the views of the Syrian government.
Instead, the Russian Federation proposed its own draft resolution, reducing the number of border crossings even further and reducing the duration of the extension. This draft resolution failed irrespective of a permanent members negative vote.
3. The veto is coded illegitimate, since the motivation does not reference Russian sovereignty or security.

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|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|
| 54 | 2019 | S/2019/961 | S/PV.8697 | China | N/A | No |
|----|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------|-----|----|

1. (See Veto ID 53 above.)
2. China vetoed the draft resolution, stating that it had had reservations regarding the cross-border relief mechanism from the beginning and that they have advocated for any operation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned.
3. China mentioned the need to respect Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, however they made no reference to China's own sovereignty and the veto is therefore coded illegitimate.

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AUTHORS: Annika Breidenstein

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM

Daniel Kjellén

Johan Bergsten

Joanna Hellström

Anton Ingstedt

Marta Lindström

Karolina Markgren

Viktor Sundman

Billy Chia-Lung Tai

Hanna Wernersson

Linnea Wikström

Linnéa Åström

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